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Summary
In collaborative systems, a set of organisations shares their computing resources, such as compute cycles, storage
space, or on-line services, in order to establish Virtual Organisations aimed at achieving common tasks. The
formation and operation of Virtual Organisations involve establishing trust among their members and reputation is
one measure by which such trust can be quantified and reasoned about. In this paper, we contribute to research in
the area of trust for collaborative computing systems along two directions: First, we provide a survey on the main
reputation-based systems that fulfill the trust requirements for collaborative systems, including reputation systems
designed for e-commerce, agent-based environments, Peer-to-Peer computing and Grid-based systems. Second,
we present a model for reputation management for Grid Virtual Organisations that is based on utility computing
and that can be used to rate users according to their resource usage and resources and their providers according to
the quality of service they deliver. We also demonstrate, through Grid simulations, how the model can be used in
improving completion and welfare in Virtual Organisations.
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1. Introduction
In collaborative systems, a Virtual Organisation
(VO) can be defined as a set of users and
real organisations that provide resources, such as
compute cycles, storage space, or on-line services,
for users to exploit for a common goal. Examples
of common goals include large-scale distributed
computing research projects [1] or inter-organisational
business applications such as Grid-based supply
chains [2], among others. In such collaborative
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systems, trust management is a fundamental problem
as resource owners must share their resources with
unknown organisations as well as ensuring that all
users abide by the VO agreement to which the
resources have been allocated.
This paper investigates how to exploit reputation
systems in the management of VOs. Reputation is
one measure by which trust among different members
of a VO can be quantified and reasoned about
(probabilities and insurances being examples of other
measures). We focus on collaborative systems where
the availability of resources is highly dynamic, and
both resource providers and users have to compete
for providing and employing resources. Reputation
systems are then used to manage reputation of
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resource providers, according to the Quality of Service
(QoS) provided, as well as reputation of users,
according to their usage of resources.
Our reputation model is grounded on a utility-
based reputation model for service computing [3]. A
reputation system gathers, aggregates, and distributes
feedbacks about participants’ behaviour. The feedback
is usually provided as an a-posteriori operation
requiring human intervention. This way of building
reputation is useful in semi-automated contexts, such
as electronic marketplaces where users rate sellers, but
it becomes a limitation in fully automated contexts
such as Grid-based collaborative systems [4]. In some
Grid applications, the resources allocated to a user’s
job are unknown to the user, and such allocation could
change during the job execution, making it difficult
to obtain user’s feedback. The model introduced in
[3] overcomes that limitation by representing users’
feedback as utility functions, which takes as input
the information provided by trustworthy monitors
after a transaction. The utility functions reflect the
satisfaction a user perceives after consuming a service;
this information is thus used to create reputation about
particular resource providers and users.
The main contribution of the paper is to study
the impact of applying reputation in VOs. Resource-
providers reputation can be used by resource
brokers in order to improve allocation of user tasks
by selecting reputable providers. Conversely, users
reputation can be used by resource providers in order
to define security level for users; low-reputable users
would be assigned tight measures when accessing a
resource.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section
2 provides a survey of the state of the art in reputation
systems for Grid and distributed computing. Section
3 describes our model of VOs. Then, Section 4
introduces the reputation model used in the paper,
a utility-based model that uses information provided
by monitors to rate entities within a Grid. Next,
Section 5 presents the system architecture and gives
an example of a usage scenario. Then, Section 6
shows experimental results and discusses the use of
reputation for both brokering and controlling resource
usage. Section 7 compares our work with others, and
finally Section 8 concludes the paper and highlights
future work.
2. Background
In this section we will introduce reputation as
a mean to assess trust and shortly present the
main developments regarding reputation systems for
computing environments.
2.1. Reputation: A Means for Assessing Trust
Reputation is a general concept widely used in all
aspects of knowledge ranging from humanities, arts
and social sciences to digital sciences. It is a concept
closely related to trust and it is defined by the
Merriam-Webster dictionary † as the “overall quality
or character as seen or judged by people in general”. In
fact, reputation is often seen as one measure by which
trust or distrust can be built based on good or bad past
experiences and observations (direct trust) [5] or based
on collected referral information (indirect trust) [6]. In
recent years, the concept of reputation has shown itself
to be useful in many areas of research in computer
science, particularly in the context of distributed and
collaborative systems, where interesting issues of
trust and security manifest themselves. Therefore, one
encounters several definitions, models and systems of
reputation in distributed computing research, of which
we attempt to touch upon a few briefly in the upcoming
sections. For a more detailed survey of reputation
models, we direct the reader to [7].
2.2. Reputation Based on Direct Experience
The simplest method to compute the reputation of
individuals in open environments is to aggregate the
received feedback after transactions and convert it in
a reputation measure. This approach is widely used
in Internet E-Commerce sites, where users rate the
providers.
Internet sites mainly use summation-based central-
ized reputation systems, based on counting all votes
or grades an entity receives. Their big advantage is
the simplicity of the reputation scheme. This makes
the reputation value to be easily understood by the
participants and allows a direct conversion between
reputation assessment and trust. The most widely
known Internet reputation system of this kind is
eBay‡. In eBay, after the end of an auction, the buyer
and the seller have the opportunity to rate each other‘s
performance with either 1 (positive), 0 (neutral) and
-1 (negative). The reputation of a user is the sum
on these individual feedback and it is a common
knowledge into the system. In eBay, most of the
feedback is positive. Although this reputation scheme
†http://www.merriam-webster.com/
‡http://www.ebay.com
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is very primitive, it works very well, being valitated by
its long time existence, acknowledging the Yhprum’s
Law: systems that shoudn’t work, sometimes do, or at
least work fairly well.
Similar feedback summation methods were pro-
posed in other e-commerce websites. Beside sum-
mation, averaging or weighting the feedback was
considered. In the Amazon§ bookstore, reputation is
assigned to books and to reviewers. A reviewer can
assign to a book between 1 and 5 stars. The reputation
of a book is the average score it received from its
reviewers. Reviewers are ranked according to the votes
they receive from the users who find their review as
valuable. Again, the reputation management system
is a centralized one and reputation is a common
knowledge in the system. Epinions¶ reputation system
works in a similar way like Amazon.
Zacharia and Maes [8] were among the first ones to
build more sophisticated reputation-based systems to
overcome existing trust problems in e-commerce on-
line applications. First, they proposed the SPORAS
system, based only on direct transaction ratings
between users. Users rate each other after a transaction
with continuous values from 0.1 to 1. The ratings of a
user are aggregated in a recursive fashion, obtaining
a reputation value that scales from 0 to 3000 and
a reputation deviation to assess the reliability of the
reputation value. SPORAS was evaluated to perform
better than the eBay and Amazon approaches.
In P2P networks, credit-based reputation mech-
anisms are employed to assess the individual
contribution of the peers. Gnutella-like P2P file
sharing systems are among the most popular P2P
networks to employ such credit-based schemes. For
such networks, [9] proposes a reputation system to
track back the past behavior of users and to allow
drawing up decisions regarding the content consumers
and providers. The reputation is a measure regarding
the level of participation of the peers in the system. In
this model, the reputation of a peer depends on (1) its
behavior assessed in accordance with the contribution
of the peer to content search and download and (2)
its capability expressed in terms of processing power,
bandwidth, storage capability and memory. Each peer
in the network gets credit for (1) processing query
response messages, (2) serving content and (3) sharing
hard-to-find content in the network. Each peer could
maintain and compute its reputation locally. But,
because there is a misbehavior threat with regard of
§http://www.amazon.com
¶http://www.epinions.com
this operation, a reputation computation agent (RCA)
is provided for the P2P network with the goal of
keeping track of transactions and of the credits and
debits that flows in the network.
P-Grid of [10] is a virtual binary search tree
built on a top of a P2P network where reputation
is an assessment of the probability that an agent
will cheat. The trust is binary; a peer can perform
a transaction correctly or not and disseminate only
negative information (complaints) as relevant. Each
leaf in the virtual tree is associated with a node from
the network. A data distribution scheme is envisaged
to spread the negative information across the tree.
Each node stores also routing information allowing
peers to query the system for relevant information
in order to locally compute the trust. The decision
regarding whether an agent is trustworthy or not is
chosen according with the following heuristics: if an
observed value for complaints exceeds the general
average of the trust measure too much, the peers might
be dishonest.
2.3. Reputation Based on Indirect Information
Building trust can be based not only on the past
interactions between entities but, also considering the
social networks the entity belongs to and the referrals
the entity can obtain using the social network. This
approach is widely considered in multi-agent research,
where [11] defines the concepts of agent communities
and social networks. The members of an online
community provide services and referrals for services
to each other. A participant in a social network
has reputation for both expertise (providing good
services) and sociability (providing good referrals).
This theoretical framework is conceptually valid also
for P2P service-oriented systems. Items under study
concern the way the reputation is represented, how
referral information is aggregated, which learning
model is used.
2.3.1. Reputation in Multi-agent Systems
In general, in agent-based systems, agents register
locally the direct and indirect trust values at various
time moments and use them in aggregation formulas
to derive the reputation measures.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [6] propose a model with
discrete values of trust: very trustworthy, trustworthy,
untrustworthy and very untrustworthy. Each agent
builds its local reputation, storing both the direct
and indirect trust values. Singh et al. [11] further
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refines the referral model of [6], using the vector space
model for representing the local trust values. After
each transaction, an agent updates its partner expertise
after verifying the delivered QoS. If the QoS is bad,
therefore, for the whole chain of agents who referred
that partner the sociability measure is decreased.
HISTOS [8] is a follower of SPORAS, taking
into account also the social network created between
users through performing transactions. The reputation
model for user A0 from user Ai point of view considers
all paths on the social network graph between these
two users. The same kind of social network was used
after that in the approaches of [12, 13].
In [14], a model, named REGRET, is proposed that
considers the following dimensions of the reputation:
the individual dimension: which is the direct trust
obtained by previous experience with another agent,
the social dimension which refers to the trust of an
agent in relation with a group and the ontological
dimension which reflects the subjective particularities
of an individual. Their model focuses on SLAs
between two parties, with several variables under
interest. This model is easy to be understood and
allows one to express the reputation for the individual
and the group-related experience and to compose
services by aggregation.
In [15], the REGRET system is further refined by
detailing more on the terms of a contract (Service
Level Agreement - SLA), with the intention to build
a trust model for the negotiation of a contract. Agents
get some utility after the execution of a contract
and each partner in a contract should have some
expectations about the outcome values of the issues.
Agents behavior is restricted by some general rules of
the society they belong to, the rules of the restricted
group of the agent and the institutional rules that
originate from the contracts the agent is involved in.
The trust model is composed by two components:
confidence - accounting for the direct trust (obtained
only by the agent’s experience) and reputation -
accounting from the trust obtained from the social
environment.
Building upon the previous two reputation models,
[16] propose a trust model with the following four
dimensions: (1) interaction trust, (2) role-based trust,
(3) witness reputation and (4) certified reputation.
Interaction trust comes for the direct experience.
Ratings are aggregated using a sophisticated time-
discount function, putting more emphasize on newer
information. Role-based trust results from the role-
based relationships between two agents (e.g. owned by
the same company, the relationship between a service
provider and its users etc). The witness reputation
is obtained from the social network of the agent,
following a query-based referral process. The certified
reputation of an agent consists of a number of certified
references about its behaviour on a particular task.
They showed that each component of the model adds
an improvement in how reliable and fast an agent finds
its partners in transactions.
2.3.2. Belief-oriented Trust
These models keep valid the basic assumptions of
the referral networks. They refine the above described
models by considering the fact that trust is a human
belief involving a subject and an object and the
trust in a system is a subjective measure. Because
of the imperfect knowledge about the reality, one
might only have an opinion about trusting an object
and this opinion could be a belief, disbelief and
uncertainty [17]. The roots of this approach are in the
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and this approach
is consistent with the theory of Marsh [18], allowing
the existence of two thresholds for expressing trust and
untrust beliefs. Trust values are continuous in this case
and the storage model can be distributed at the levels
of the nodes in the system.
Jøsang [17, 19] derives the Beta reputation model,
based on the subjective logic. The Jøsang’s subjective
logic is a trivalent one, an opinion having three
degrees of positive values: belief (b), disbelief (d) and
uncertainty (u), with b + d + u = 1. b, d and u can
be assessed from the previous experience of the agent
with the object of the trust using the beta distribution
function, which is applicable in a space where every
event can be successful or unsuccessful. Each agent
can apply the following operators to produce its
internal trust model: (1) the conjunction operator in
order to infer a conclusion about a proposition, having
two opinions about that proposition (2) the consensus
operator between independent and dependent opinions
(3) the recommendation operator, allowing the agent
to include in the inference chain the recommendations
received from a referral.
In [20], [21] and [22], reputation systems are
developed based on the Beta model described above.
Furthermore, the model of Yu and Singh [23] is
more expressive than that of Jøsang‘s as they allow
continuous values in order to assess the outcome of
a transaction. On their model, they directly use the
Dempster’s rule of combination in order to aggregate
two belief functions built on different evidences. This
operator has the same meaning as the conjunction
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operator in the Jøsang‘s model. In [23], an agent
local decision model is described for selection of a
transaction partner based on beliefs.
2.3.3. P2P Approaches
In P2P systems, one main concern is the identification
of malicious peers that provides misleading services.
Trust models might prevent such behavior and might
improve the reliability and fault tolerance of the
system. In a P2P approach, the challenge is how to
aggregate the local trust values without a centralized
storage management and facility. Beside, two kinds
of questions are addressed by P2P approaches: what
trust metric should be considered and how to store
reliably and securely the trust values across the
network. P2P reputation systems should be [24]: (1)
self-policing: no central authority should exist and
the peers should enforce the ethical behavior by
themselves, (2) anonymous: peer reputation should be
associated with an opaque identifier, (3) the system
should not assign profit to newcomers, (4) minimal
overhead and (5) robust to malicious collectives of
peers.
Rather than the approach of [9] which is a
transaction-based one in a Gnutella-like P2P file shar-
ing system, TrustMe [25] is a user-based approach,
adopting the principle of obtaining references about a
peer, before engaging in a transaction with that peer.
Broadly, TrustMe functions in the following manner:
each peer is equipped with a couple of public-private
key pairs. Trust values of a peer B are randomly stored
at another peer THA in the network. Any peer A
interested in the trust value of a peer B broadcast the
query on the network and the THA peers replies this
query. After interaction, peer A files a report for peer B
indicating the new trust value for B and therefore, THA
can modify the trust value of B accordingly. TrustMe
uses a smart public key cryptography mechanism to
provide security, reliability and accountability.
PeerTrust [26] is based on five important parameters
contributing to a general trust metric: (1) the feedback
a peer obtains from other peers, (2) the feedback
scope counted as the number of total transactions
that a peer has with other peers, (3) the credibility
factor for the feedback source, (4) the transaction
context factor discriminating between mission-critical
and non-critical transactions and (5) the community
context factor for addressing community-related
characteristics. Credibility is assessed either using
recursively the local trust values, either using the
similarity between satisfaction vectors collected from
the peers. This model resembles with the models
from the agent world [14, 15, 16] where reputation is
assessed on various important dimensions.
A referral network is used in [12] as a source for
obtaining recommendations in a P2P environment.
Like in P-Grid, trust is a probabilistic measure. A
graph overlay is designed on the top of the P2P
network by linking peers who have direct transactional
relationship or who are indirectly socially linked by
referrals. In their approach, they model the ability of
a peer to make recommendations, which is different
from the peer trustworthiness. Assuming a probability
lk that a peer pk lies, one can derive the probability of
observing a good or bad report from peer k about peer
j. Given a sample of independent reports about peer j,
one can compute the likelihood behavior of j, which
in turn, depends on the internal probability of agent j
for performing honestly. Maximizing this likelihood,
one can obtain the probability associated with a peer.
The model is further detailed by considering several
services provided by the peers.
The NICE approach [13] targets a specific P2P
network implementation, the NICE platform. The trust
value of a node B at a node A is a measure of how likely
the node A believes a transaction with node B will be
successful. In NICE, each peer is equipped with a pair
of public and private keys and the messages are signed
by their creators. After each transaction between a
client A and a servant B, A generates a cookie with
its perceived feedback (trust value) for the transaction
and this cookie can be stored by the servant B. B can
decide which cookies to store and how long to store
such a cookie. More, each peer could posses its own
algorithm for updating and storing the trust values
it receives from transaction partners. When a peer A
deliberates to enter a transaction with peer B and A
has no direct evidence (cookies) for B, A will ask its
partners about having cookies for B and the partners
will continue to spread the request into the network
till a path between A and B is established, building
the social network graph. The paths between A and
B are evaluated either by selecting the minimum trust
value on the path or by multiplying the trust values.
Therefore, the strongest path can be selected. When
testing this protocol against malicious peers (peers that
do not follow the NICE trust protocol), the authors
observed a robust cooperative emerging in the system.
EigenTrust [24] proposes a robust distributed
method to compute the global trust in a fully
decentralized P2P network, where each peer stores
locally the trust values for all the rest of peers in
the system. Their approach is based on the notion
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of transitive trust: a peer i has a high opinion of
those peers who have supplied with good services
and therefore, peer i is likely to trust the opinions
of those peers. The idea of transitive trust leads to
a system where global trust values correspond to the
left principal eigenvector of a matrix of normalized
local trust values. At every iteration of the EigenTrust
scheme, each peer will interrogate its neighbors for
their local trust values and further refine and distribute
the global trust vector partially computed.
2.4. Incentive Compatible Approaches
In its classical understanding, reputation is an
supplemental tool in order to enhance other critical
mechanisms inside the computing environment, such
us the resource management. Usually, agents are
assumed to report truthfully either the direct feedback
or their opinion about others. But, as observed
by [27], it is not in the best of an agent to (i)
report reputation information because it provides a
competitive advantage to others; (ii) report positive
ratings because the agent slightly decrease its own
reputation with respect to the average of other
agents and therefore, reporting negative ratings the
agent will increase its own reputation. Therefore,
reputation might be combined with an incentive
mechanism in order that reputation sharing to become
a rational alternative for an agent. The game-
theoretical approach to reputation directs the research
in this direction. Side-payments are envisaged in [27]
as incentives for agents. Some R-Agents manages the
reputation and the side-payments in the system. Each
agent that needs reputation information for a partner
will buy this information from the R-Agents. Each
transaction in the system is monetary valued. After
the transaction, each agent can submit paid reputation
reports to the R-Agents. R-Agents will pay positive
amounts for similar reports regarding a target agent.
They showed rational behavior is mutually enforced if
the environment consists in majority of honest agents.
The authors extended the model for pricing services
in P2P networks [28] and for improving the service
level agreement in the web services world [29].
2.5. Reputation Management in Grids
Reputation models can bring with more dependability
in the grid either by tackling the sabotage tolerance
issue, improving resource allocation and scheduling or
fine-graining the user access. In all cases, the usage
of reputation models affects the notion of trust in the
grid computing environment, allowing the system to
construct the soft version of trust.
Sabotage tolerance problem is specific for desktop
grids [30] that collect idle computing power from
desktop computers gathered voluntarily from Internet.
Workers that participate in the system have incentives
to sabotage the computation in order to get more
credit in the system. Credibility-based fault tolerance
is introduced in [31] that combines result verification
by task replication with a reputation mechanism.
Each worker scores has a credibility related with his
past behavior. The credibility of a worker is further
transfered to his submitted results and to the group
of results related with a work entry. The credibility
of a result group is an estimate of the conditional
probability that the result being correct. A result
will be accepted if it counts at least some minimum
threshold v.
A trust-based scheduling model is defined in [32]
in desktop grids based on the principle of ”trust and
verify”. Each worker will be verified by spot-checking
and will gather reputation by successfully passing
the verification. Workers with higher reputation will
require less verification than ones with a lower trust
values. In [33], the reputation mechanism is combined
with a weighted voting scheme to decide about the
requested level of replication necessary to accept a
result.
In classical grids, Laszewski et al. [34] exploit
the beneficial properties of EigenTrust [24]. They
integrate the trust management system as part
of the QoS management framework, proposing to
probabilistically pre-select the resources based on
their likelihood to deliver the requested capability
and capacity. Considering two organizations whose
entities interact, a trust table stores the direct trust
between the organizations, for each context of the
transactions. The global trust between organizations at
time t is computed by weighting the direct trust table
entry with a time decay weight. The trust relationship
of organization i for another organization j for a
context c is obtained by aggregating the direct trust
between these two organizations with the reputation
of organization j, weighted with normalized values.
The global trust or reputation of an organization j
is computed by obtaining recommendations from a
third organization and by aggregating the received
recommendations with the direct trust values, applying
the time decay function specific for the given context.
This value is normalized as to scale to [0, 1].
PathTrust [35] is a reputation system proposed for
member selection in the formation phase of a virtual
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organization. To enter the VO formation process, a
member must register with an Enterprise Network
(EN) infrastructure by presenting some credentials.
Besides user management, EN supplies with a
centralized reputation service. At the dissolution of
the VO, each member leaves feedback ratings to
the reputation server for other members with whom
they experienced transactions. The system requires
each transaction to be rated by the participants.
PathTrust arranges the participants in graph structure
similar with the social network described in the agent
approaches. Each edge in the graph is weighted
with the trust between the nodes at the ends of the
edge, computed by counting all the positive feedback
between the nodes and subtracting all the negative
one. Like NICE [13], the graph is used to assess the
reputation between two nodes that do not have direct
transactions.
In this paper we will use a reputation approach
devised for service oriented computing, inspired
from the benefits of the above-presented models
and try to overcome the main limitation of the
classical feedback-based reputation models: the
subjectivity of the opinions. As we have seen in this
section, all reputation models based on posteriori-
collected feedback should consider that the content
of these messages might be intentionally distorted by
malicious reporters.
3. A Model of Virtual Organisations
In order to support rapid formation of VOs, we
use the concept of virtual breeding environment
(VBE) [36] adopted from the Virtual Enterprises
community. A VBE can be defined as an association
of organisations adhering to common operating
principles and infrastructure with the main objective of
participating in potential VOs. In this paper, we have
adopted the view that organisations participating in a
VO are selected from a VBE, as illustrated in figure 1.
Such organisations may provide services, repre-
sented by ovals, and include users that utilise VO
services, represented by small squares. Organisations
pre-register to a VBE via the VO Manager component,
including description of the services they are willing
to share in a Grid and the list of potential users
belonging to the organisation. When a user wants to
create a VO, he assumes the role of VO Owner and
contacts the VO Manager with the description of the
needed services. The VO Manager includes a service
brokering component that suggests potential concrete
Fig. 1. VBE and VO Models
services and their service providers. The VO Owner
then selects a subset of these service providers and
their services, and then defines the list of users for the
VO.
The VBE can be seen as a market place where
service providers are competing to participate in VOs
and users within VOs are competing to use services.
Reputation information about service providers can
be used as a parameter for guiding the selection of
VO partners. On the other hand, having reputation
information about users could help service providers
to implant tighter security mechanisms for accessing
their services and the resources underlying them.
4. A Utility-Based Reputation Model for VOs
In this section, we develop a general utility-based
reputation model for VOs, which will be used later
to manage reputation in service-oriented VOs. Our
reputation model is based on the model described
in [3]. The model was initially devised for service-
oriented computing in grid systems and improves the
models presented in subsection 2.5.
Central to our model is the notion of an
organisation. The set of all organisations is denoted
by Org. We keep track of all VOs that have
existed and use the set VOId to denote the set of
all VO identifiers. The entities we want to keep
reputation values for are defined as elements of the
set Ent. An obvious restriction is that an entity must
belong to an organisation. We are interested in some
particular issues of interest associated to an entity;
the set of all issues of interest is represented by
Issue. The individuals that consume (use) the entities
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and qualify them are members of the set Cons.
The sets Ent, Issue and Cons are considered type
parameters that will be instantiated according to the
domain we are interested in. Below we represent
above types and their associations as functions,
using the mathematical notations provided by the Z
specification language [37].
[Org, VOId]
VOS : VOId 7→ POrg
[Cons,Ent, Issue]
EntOrg : Ent→ Org
EntIssue : Ent→ P Issue
EntCons : Ent 7→ PCons
Notation [Org,VOId] introduces Org and VOId as
basic types. VOS associates a VO with the set of
organisations participating in it. Function EntOrg
associates an entity with the organisation to which it
belongs to; EntIssue relates an entity with its issues
of interest; and EntCons associates an entity with its
consumers.
In our model, we assume the existence of monitors
that deliver events indicating the current value
produced by an entity for a consumer in relation to a
particular issue of interest within a VO, at an observed
moment of time. We represent an event as a tuple that
contains of the following elements: the time stamp of
the event, a consumer, an entity, an issue, VOId and a
k number of attributes, Attr. A trace corresponds to a
sequence of events:
Event == TimeStamp× Cons× Ent × Issue×
VOId × Attr1 × . . .× Attrk
Trace == seq Event
A utility function reflects the satisfaction of a
consumer in relation to a particular entity. It relates
an event with a numeric value indicating what is really
received by the consumer:
utility : Event→ [0, 1]
The complete definition of a utility function is
considered to be domain specific.
Utility functions are used to define the reputation
of an entity in relation to a particular issue of interest
from the perspective of a consumer.
[Cons,Ent, Issue]
rep eic : Time× Cons× Ent×
Issue× VOId → [0, 1]
∀ c : Cons, e : Ent, i : Issue, vo : VOId •
rep eic(t, c, e, i, vo) =∑
ev∈Trace{(ts,c,e,i,vo,··· )∈Event}
ϕ(t,ts)utility(ev)
#(Trace{(ts,c,e,i,vo,··· )∈Event})
where #s denotes the cardinality of sequence s and
s  A denotes the largest subsequence of s containing
only those objects that are elements of A. ϕ(t, ts) is
a time discount function that puts more importance
on events registered closer in time with the moment
of computing the reputation. Reputation, rep eic,
is defined as the weighted average of the utilities
obtained from all generated events so far; it is defined
as a generic function paremeterised by sets Cons,Ent
and Issue.
As a fitness measure for the above-defined
reputation, we consider the reputation deviation
dev rep eic. The reputation deviation shows how
much the reputation varies in time and it evaluates the
stability in the behavior of the VO members.
[Cons,Ent, Issue]
dev rep eic : Time× Cons× Ent×
Issue× VOId → [0, 1]
∀ c : Cons, e : Ent, i : Issue, vo : VOId •
dev rep eic(t, c, e, i, vo) =∑
ev∈Trace{(ts,c,e,i,vo,... )∈Event}
ϕ(t,ts)|utility(ev)−rep eic(t,c,e,i,vo)|
#(Trace{(ts,c,e,i,vo,... )∈Event})
Aggregating the reputation of an entity over all its
consumers within a VO produces the reputation of the
entity in the VO with respect to a particular issue of
interest.
[Ent, Issue]
rep ei : Time× Ent × Issue× VOId → [0, 1]
∀ e : Ent, i : Issue, vo : VOId •
rep ei(t, e, i, vo) =
∑
c∈EntCons(e)
rep eic(t,c,e,i,vo)
#EntCons(e)
Reputation function rep ei is defined as a generic
function paremeterised by sets Ent and Issue.
The reputation of an entity in a VO is then the
aggregation of its reputation in each of its issues of
interest within that VO.
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[Ent]
rep e : Time× Ent × VOId → [0, 1]
∀ e : Ent, vo : VOId •
rep e(t, e, vo) =
∑
i∈EntIssue(e)
rep ei(t,e,i,vo)
#EntIssue(e)
The general VBE reputation of an entity is then the
aggregation of its reputation in all VOs.
[Ent]
rep : Time× Ent→ [0, 1]
∀ e : Ent • rep(t, e) =
∑
vo∈dom VOS
rep e(t,e,vo)
#dom VOS
This last definition assumes that the domain of
VOS represents the VBE; i.e. all the organisations
participating in it.
Reputation deviation can be defined for all above-
presented reputation deviation.
4.1. Properties of the Reputation Model
In this section we shortly discuss the properties of the
reputation model presented above.
At the beginning we should note the usage of
monitors to gather data for building the reputation.
Most reputation models presented in section 2 are
based on direct or indirect feedback collected from
information sources with questionable reputation.
As many VBEs (like Grids) supply with trustable
monitoring services, using the data provided by those
services seems to be a good alternative.
Next, central to the described reputation model
resides the utility functions. Utility functions reflect
the consumer perception about the delivered services.
The utility function is an intrinsic evaluation of each
consumer and might be difficult to construct it. We
assume that somehow, the reputation manager builds
the utility function of each consumer before the service
to be delivered. For example, every user that joins
a VBE and registers to the reputation management
service can pass a questionnaire used to further infer
the utility function for that user. Knowing the utility
functions before service delivery is a key feature of
our model because it reduces the risk of cheating. If
the consumer reveals out another utility function than
its real one, it will end up with a service delivery
associated with this wrong utility function, thus, will
not benefit any more from the participation in the
collaborative system.
When computing the reputation, instantaneous
utility values associated with the events are weighted
using a time discount function. Putting more
emphasize on newer events represents a widely
accepted approach in the reputation management
literature [14, 15, 16]. We recommend the following
time discount function, also adopted by [16]:
ϕ(t, ts) = e−
t−ts
λ
λ is a parameter used to tune the importance of
the newer events against older ones and its value is
related with the time scale employed by the monitors
for registering the events.
Figure 2 depicts the reputation for a service with one
issue uniformly delivered in a variation band of 85%
to 105% of the agreed QoS for the issue. On the top
plot we depicted the cloud of the observed events. We
considered 1000 time units. We can notice that at the
begining of the experiment, after a short learning time
frame, the reputation stabilizes itself around a value.
Fig. 2. Reputation when the issue is delivered uniformly
distributed in a variation band
Figure 3 we considered a similar setup, but now,
between time units 200 and 300 the consumer
perceived a decay in the QoS. We can note the
reputation recovers slowly after the dramatic decay in
the QoS and on the long time, as the consumer gets
continuously the same delivery patters as before the
decay, the reputation converges to the initial value.
Reputation deviation can be used to decide in cases
the service is delivered with a fluctuating quality.
A reputation value accompanied with a smaller
reputation deviation indicates a higher confidence in
the expected value for the item under study. For
example, normal distributed values around a central
average are less fluctuating than uniformly distributed
values around the same average. The upper part of
figure 4 shows the how reputation varies in time for
two patterns of QoS delivery explained above. In
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Fig. 3. Reputation when there is a decay in the QoS delivery
the lower part of the figure we can notice that the
reputation deviation curve for the case of the normal
delivery is situated below the curve for the uniform
delivery of the QoS, indicating much confidence on
the reputation of the first provider.
Fig. 4. Reputation deviation used to assess the confidence in
the reputation value
4.2. Reputation Management for VO Service
Providers
Here we aim at maintaining reputation for organisa-
tions as service providers in a VO according to the
Quality of Service (QoS) of the services they provide.
In this model, consumers correspond to the users in
a VO, denoted by VOUser, and entities correspond
to the VO services, denoted by the set Srv. There are
several options for selecting issues of interest. We can
have either a fine granularity where each service level
objective defined for a service can be seen as an issue
of interest, or a coarse granularity where the whole
QoS can be seen as a single issue of interest. For
simplicity, we select the latter option.
Functions UsersVO and SrvVO represent the set of
users of a VO and the services that an organisation
provides to a VO, respectively.
UsersVO : VOId → PVOUser
SrvVO : VOId × Org→ P Srv
As we mentioned earlier, our model requires the
existence of monitors capable of detecting variations
in the QoS of each service and generating events to
inform the reputation system about such variations.
An event is then represented as a tuple denoting the
current value of the QoS of a service being used by a
user within a VO.
Event == TimeStamp× VOUser × Srv×
{QoS} × VOId × R
where QoS is a name indicating the QoS issue. In
order to define the corresponding utility function, we
introduce an auxiliary function indicating the Service
Level Agreement (SLA) accorded between a VO user
and a service provider for a particular service within a
VO.
SLA : VOUser × Srv× VOId → R
The SLA function represents the expected quality of a
service. It is used to define the utility (satisfaction) a
user gets when consuming a VO service.
utility : Event→ R
∀(u, s,QoS, id, v) ∈ Event •
utility((u, s,QoS, id, v)) ={
1 if v ≥ SLA(u, s, id)
v
SLA(u,s,id) if v < SLA(u, s, id)
We can now define the reputation of a service using
the reputation functions defined in the previous
section. Here Srv rep eic denotes the reputation
value given by a particular VO user to a service in
relation to its QoS in the VO. Srv rep ei represents
the reputation of a service taking into account its
QoS in a VO; it is an aggregation of the reputation
given by all users to the service in relation to the QoS
issue of interest within that VO. Srv rep e denotes
the reputation of a service in a VO. Finally, Srv rep
indicates the general reputation of a service. Note,
since we have only one issue of interest, Srv rep ei
and Srv rep e will be equivalent. All these reputation
values are computed at a given time moment.
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Srv rep eic == rep eic[Time,VOUser, Srv,
{QoS}]
Srv rep ei == rep ei[Time, Srv, {QoS}]
Srv rep e == rep ei[Time, Srv]
Srv rep == rep[Time, Srv]
Using the above functions, we can now define the
reputation of an organisation in a VO and its reputation
in a VBE. The reputation of an organisation in a VO,
denoted by Org rep VO, is defined as the aggregation
of the reputation of all the services it provides to that
VO.
Org rep VO : TimeStamp× Org
×VOId → R
∀ o ∈ Org, vo ∈ VOId •
Org rep VO(t, o, vo) =∑
e∈SrvVO(vo,o)
Srv rep e(t,e,vo)
#SrvVO(vo,o)
On the other hand, the general VBE reputation of an
organisation is defined as the aggregation over all its
VO reputations.
Org rep VBE : TimeStamp× Org→ R
∀ o ∈ Org •
Org rep VBE(t, o) =∑
vo∈{v∈dom VOS|o∈VOS(v)}
Org rep VO(t,o,vo)
#{v∈dom VOS|o∈VOS(v)}
4.3. Reputation Management for VO Users
Next, we discuss how to maintain the reputation of
users within a VO and within a VBE according to their
usage of VO services. In this model, users, denoted
by set VOUser, are seen as entities who could execute
some pre-defined actions on services following pre-
established policies. Services, denoted by set Srv, are
seen as consumers that qualify users in relation to their
actions. If a user attempts to execute an action that is
not allowed by the VO policy, it will be given a bad
qualification by the service that would be reflected in
the user’s reputation. In some sense, the model here
reverses the notions of consumers and entities with
respect to the model of previous section.
The set, Action, denotes the set of possible actions
that can be performed on services. A policy indicates
the set of actions a user is allowed to perform on the
service in a VO. It represents the expected behaviour
of the user.
policy : VOUser × Srv× VOId → PAction
A penalty function penalises a user with a value in the
interval [0, 1) if he executes non-permitted actions
penalty : VOUser × Srv× VOId
×Action→ [0, 1)
∀ u : VOuser, s : Srv, vo : VOId, a : Action •
(u, s, vo, a) ∈ dom penalty ⇒
a 6∈ policy(u, s, vo)
Now, events are defined as follows:
Event == TimeStamp× Srv× VOUser×
{Usage} × VOId × Action
where Usage is a name indicating the service-usage
issue of interest. We assume the existence of functions,
policy and penalty, that are used to define the utility
that a service gets according to the actions performed
by a user in a VO. These functions are domain-
specific, and based on them, once can define the utility
function as follows.
utility : Event→ R
∀(r, u,Usage, vo, a) ∈ Event •
utility((r, u,Usage, vo, a)) ={
1, if a ∈ policy(u, r, vo)
1− penalty(u, r, vo, a), if a 6∈ policy(u, r, vo)
We can now define the reputation of a user using
the reputation functions defined in Section 4. Here
User rep eic denotes the reputation value given by
a particular service to a VO user in relation to the
Usage of the service in a VO. User rep ei represents
the reputation of a user taking into account its service
usage in a VO; it aggregates the reputation of the
user for all services he uses in the VO. User rep e
denotes the reputation of a user in a VO; it corresponds
to an aggregation of the reputation of all his issues
of interest. Since we have only one issue of interest,
User rep ei and User rep e are equivalent. Finally,
User rep indicates the reputation of a user in the VBE.
User rep eic == rep eic[Time, Srv,VOUser,
{Usage}]
User rep ei == rep ei[Time,VOUser,
{Usage}]
User rep e == rep ei[Time,VOUser]
User rep == rep[Time,VOUser]
5. A Reputation Management System
Here we present the architecture of a VO that uses
reputation management in order to facilitate the rating
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Fig. 5. Reputation Management in VOs
of both VO services and users. The architecture
was implemented in the EU FP6 project GridTrust‖.
In this architecture, the VO Management subsystem
consists of other services in addition to the Reputation
Management (RM) service, such as a VO Manager
(VOM), a Reputation-aware Service Broker (RSB)
and a Service Usage Control and Monitoring (SUCM)
service. The system is shown in Figure 5.
The VOM informs the RM service of the setting up
of a new VO, which includes the registration of the list
of VO services and users, as shown in the following
protocol:
VOM→ RM : setVO(VO ID, Service ID List, User ID List)
RM→ VOM : ack()
Where VO ID is the identity of the VO being
registered, Service ID List is the list of services of the
VO, and User ID List is the list of users in the VO. On
the other hand, the termination of an existing VO is
carried out through the following protocol:
VOM→ RM : endVO(VO ID)
RM→ VOM : ack()
Where VO ID is the identity of the VO being
terminated. The RSB service is used during the setting
of new VOs by the VOM. During this phase, the RSB
may request from the RM service the reputation of
a service in a particular VO or in the general VBE
‖http://www.gridtrust.eu
before proposing it to the VOM:
RSB→ RM : getServiceRep(Service ID, VO ID)
RM→ RSB : return(Service ID, Reputation Value)
In case the VO ID is assigned a NULL value, the
returned reputation will be the service’s reputation in
the general VBE.
The SUCM service is a service that monitors
requests and replies sent to and from a service in its
interaction with a VO user. The SUCM service can
detect any undesirable behaviour by the user in its
usage of the service being protected by that instance
of SUCM. This could be for example the excessive
storage of data on resources underlying the service
beyond the user’s quota. Hence, the SUCM service
can report prohibited actions performed by the VO
users to the RM service as follows:
SUCM→ RM : reportUser(Service ID, User ID, VO ID, Action)
RM→ SUCM : ack()
The RM service can also accept ratings by the VO
users of the QoS levels they have experienced in their
interactions with VO services. This is done through
the following protocol, in which the user reports the
QoS value:
User→ RM : rateService(User ID, Service ID, VO ID, QoS Value)
RM→ User : ack()
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Finally, any of the entities in a VO may request
from the RM service the reputation of a user:
Any→ RM : getUserRep(User ID, VO ID)
RM→ Any : return(User ID, Reputation Value)
Again, in the event that the VO ID is assigned a
NULL value, the returned reputation will be the user’s
reputation in the general VBE.
5.1. Usage Scenario
We consider here an example of a usage scenario of
the RM system as shown in Figure 6. We assume
that a RSB starts by querying the RM system for
the reputation of a couple of services, Service1 and
Service2, in order to join them to a new VO. After that,
the VOM signals to the RM system the setting up of
the new VO and informs the latter of the two services
and three users, User1, User2 and User3. Once this
operation is acknowledged by the RM system, the VO
becomes operational and the users can avail of the
services offered.
At some stage, the SUCM service at Service1
captures a prohibited action performed by User3
and thus reports it to the RM system. Based on
the utility function for Service1 and the penalty for
the prohibited action, the RM system computes the
satisfaction of Service1 regarding this action and
updates accordingly the different reputation values
for User3. Some time later, the SUCM service for
Service1 requests to obtain the new reputation value
for User3. Based on this new value, SUCM revises its
decision to grant access to User3 to use Service1. This
may or may not change the access right for User3.
Finally, the VOM decides to end the VO (e.g. as a
result of achieving its goals) and informs the RM
system of this decision. The RM system acknowledges
this decision.
6. Analysis of the Reputation Models
This section describes the results we obtained by
performing simulations with various VO setups. We
have run our experiments using the SimGrid simulator
[38] on which we implemented the following VO
operation scenarios:
• VOs with reputation-rated resource providers;
• VOs with reputation-rated users; and
• VOs with reputation-rated resource providers
and rated users.
In all simulated scenarios, we compared the results
against the case when reputation is not considered to
enhance resource management in VOs.
We emphasize from the very beginning on the
advantages of our reputation model. First, because
we base our model on a-priori collected utility
functions, we eliminate one of the biggest drawback of
reputation-based trust: the subjectivity of the collected
feedback. If the service consumer does not provide
truthful information, the provider will be unable to
compile the real utility function and will deliver the
service accordingly. Thus, as the rational consumers
desire to obtain the expected quality of service,
they can not manipulate the reputation of a provider
without suffering themselves from worsening the
received service quality.
Second, our virtual environment is equipped with
a trustful reputation manager. Thus, all messages
containing valuable information for computing the
reputation can not be tampered by malicious nodes.
As the reputation manager collects all the individual
utility functions, it can unify the perception about the
service delivery via the computed reputation measure.
With our reputation model we tackle a major
drawback of the quality of service measurement: the
fact that various nodes in the system have different
representations about which is a good quality delivery.
6.1. VOs with reputation-rated resource
providers
First, we considered a VO with users submitting
requests to resource providers for a service. We allow
20% of the providers to produce random QoS values
uniformly distributed in a variation band between
85− 105% of the agreed SLA expected quality. For
scheduling the requests to VO nodes we used the
Res rep e value and we allowed that each node will
obtain a number of service reuqests proportionaly with
its reputation. For a batch of jobs originating from
the VO users, we computed the total completion time
and the total welfare produced in the system. Total
welfare is obtained by suming all utilities acquired by
the users for the submitted jobs. We varied the load
factors of the system. The load factor is defined as the
proportion of the requested system capacity at a given
moment of time vs the total available capacity to be
delivered by the VO. For comparison, we allowed the
resource broker to schedule the requests in a round-
robin fashion. Figures 7 and 8 show the results.
We should note that with using a reputation-based
scheduling, the total completion time is better with
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Fig. 6. Usage Scenario of the Reputation Management System
Fig. 7. Comparing reputation-based scheduling with round-
robin: completion time
around 25% for every load factor of the system.
More, the system produses 25% much welfare with
reputation. The gain in welfare was registered due the
fact that the reputation manager has a global view
about the quality of the service - through the a-priori
collected utility functions. Thus, it can enhance the
borkering by selecting appropiate providers for a given
consumer.
Fig. 8. Comparing reputation-based scheduling with round-
robin: welfare
6.2. VOs with reputation-rated users
Next, we simulate the system with unreliable users. An
unreliable user tries to execute un-permitted actions.
We set the fraction of unreliable users to f = 20%,
each introducing malicious actions with a sabotage
rate of s = 20%. Each action gets a random penalty
from [0, 1). Each un-permitted request is identified
and refused by the system after its execution and its
Copyright c© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Prepared using secauth.cls
Security Comm. Networks 00: 1–18 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/sec
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT IN COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING SYSTEMS 15
result gets discarded and never reaches back the user.
We should note that the system is now loaded with a
fraction fs of malicious requests and it spends some
useless time to fulfill those requests.
To simulate this setup, we use a resource centric
brokering approach: for an available resource, the
next action/job is selected from the available ones
according with the reputation of the user who entered
the action in the system. For reputation, we used the
User rep e value. Such a broker will postpone the
execution of an action originating at a less reputed
user as late as possible, maximizing the efficiency of
the spent running time of the resource. Figure 9 shows
how the proportion of time spent on processing trustful
actions varies during the VO existence. We compared
the reputation-enhanced broker with a broker that
schedules the tasks on the first-come first-served
principle.
Fig. 9. Time consumption efficiency for a system with
malicious users. We allowed 20% of users to be malicious
and having a sabotage rate of 20%.
We can note that at the beginning of the VO life, the
reputation-enhanced broker (depicted with dotted line)
schedules only tasks/actions coming from reputed
users. The broker starts to schedule tasks from less
reputed users only when tasks get scarce in the VO.
More, we can note that the overall fraction of time
spent on tasks computing is bigger than in the case of
a first-come first-served broker. Thus, the reputation
manager succeeds to perform a distinction between
malicious users and the truthful ones, enabling an
enhanced brokering of the reputed users tasks.
6.3. VOs with reputation-rated resource
providers and rated users
A more complex scheduling is the one that selects
the most reputable available resource and puts on it
the job of the most reputable user. This later setup
simulates the case of a VO with unreliable users
executing actions on unreliable resource providers.
Our scheduling intends to protect reputed providers by
assigning on them actions from reliable users.
As a benchmark, we used the FIFO (round-robin)
scheduling, at each resource executing the oldest
request in the system.
Figure 10 shows the simulation results. We counted
the total welfare (satisfaction) produced and we
depicted the welfare acquisition curve for each of
the three cases described above. The Y axis plots
the proportion of the total satisfaction perceived by
the users during the time. We can note that the case
when the broker is aware both about the reputation
of users and of resources allows for a quicker welfare
accumulation. The case when scheduling is done on
the basis of first-come first-serve (in both regarding the
resources and the user actions) is the worse, letting the
users to accumulate satisfaction only latter in time. We
should note that by the middle of the simulation, for a
total of about 4% (20%x20%) malicious actions, we
get about 10% more satisfaction acquired.
Fig. 10. Reputation based scheduling with user and resource
reputation. We allowed 20% of users to be malicious and
having a sabotage rate of 20%.
We should note that in VOs with reliable users and
unreliable resources, the reputation-based approach
increases the overall system performance in the
sense that tasks get faster executed. With unreliable
users, using the reputation-based approach the system
increases the user satisfaction by allowing trustfull
users to benefit first. Furthermore, the reliable
resources are used more effective, in the sense that
trusted actions are assigned on them.
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7. Discussion
In this section we compare our reputation model
with the main related models reviewed in Section
2 according to the following criteria: uniqueness of
the identities of the participating entities, searching
reputation information, reliability of reputation infor-
mation, and contextual management. These criteria
have an impact on managing reputation for dynamic
VOs.
• Unique identities.
Identity uniqueness is concerned with the question
of whether there is a global principal identification
mechanism or not. In the case of our reputation
management system, both users and services are
identified uniquely (Users with an X509 certificate
and service with a unique id) within the scope of
a single VBE. Our model in this respect is similar
to the NICE approach of [13], which also considers
unique identities but does not focus on the issue of
how trust-based data will be associated with such
identities. However, our model is limited with respect
to providing inter-VBE unique identification.
• Searching reputation information.
This criterion is concerned with the manner in which
an entity finds trustworthiness information about other
entities and the scope of that information. Usually,
this is either done in a direct or an indirect manner
and the scope of the information could range from
the individual to the community-wide. In our model,
the reputation values of service providers and their
services or users are obtained directly from the
Reputation Management service and reputation is not
obtained indirectly by passing through middle entities.
This is unlike P2P solutions (Section 2.3.3), where
each entity maintains a list of its recommenders
or neighbours, and thus when the entity needs the
required trust data about another entity, it contacts
its neighbours. If a neighbour has the desired data it
returns the data to the entity, otherwise it contacts its
own neighbours and so on, therefore creating a chain
of trust. The process continues until either an entity
with the desired data is found, or the chain limit is
reached.
The scope of the reputation in our model could
be either individual (rep eic) or community-wide
as represented by the VBE reputation (rep). In the
latter case, the VBE is seen as the community
itself and our model maintains reputation within its
scope. This is similar to the solution adopted in
PathTrust [35], where an enterprise network (a concept
similar to VBE) is seen as the community. In other
systems (for example, REGRET [14]), small groups of
communities are formed; in this approach an entity’s
own experience is checked and the group is consulted
for opinions.
• Reliability of reputation information.
The question of the reliability of the information
used in calculating the reputation of entities is an
important one as it affects trust-based decisions. There
are several approaches to determine the reliability
of reputation information. For instance, P-Grid [10]
assumes that if an entity is trustworthy, then it is also
reliable in providing recommendations. Other systems
separate the two cases: the general reputation and
the specific one in providing recommendations (for
instance [23]).
An interesting approach is the use of weights
as a measure of the reliability of trustworthiness
information as was adopted by [19] in the Beta
Reputation system. In our model, such weights can be
added in as an attribute to the events generated by the
reputation monitor and the definitions of the various
reputation values can be adjusted accordingly.
• Context Management.
Reputation depends on a context. In our model,
context is represented by the issue of interest variable,
allowing us to keep reputation on several contexts
(issues of interest) simultaneously. In many existing
reputation solutions, there is a very limited or no
consideration of the context in which reputation is
mentioned (for example, the EigenTrust algorithm
[24]). PeerTrust [26] provides a coarse mission critical
and non-critical classification of the contexts of
transactions. On the other hand, Laszewski et al. [34]
allow contexts to be considered in a limited manner.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
Trust in distributed computing is an important area
of research, which contributes to the strengthening
of security and the enhancement of the robustness of
information sharing. Reputation is one measure by
which trust can be quantified and reasoned upon.
Our main contribution in this paper was to define a
model for reputation management in service-oriented
virtual organisations that is based on utility computing
and that can be used to rate users according to their
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service usage and service providers and their services
according to the quality of service they deliver.
We also demonstrated, through Grid simulations, the
behaviour of the model regarding completion time and
welfare, both of which showed improvements over
non-reputation-based VOs.
There are several areas in which our model
can be extended and improved. The portability of
reputation across VBEs is one such area in which an
entity or a consumer who change their community
(VBE) can bring along their reputation from previous
communities to any new ones they join. Another area
is to enhance the model to be able to express the
reliability of events by adding weights to them. Also,
the language of the issues of interest is currently left
undefined (apart from the service QoS and service
Usage terms). Such a language is domain-specific and
it can be obtained from domain-specific ontologies.
Finally, an interesting area is to model the reputation
of orchestrated services based on the reputation of the
individual services. This requires the definition of a
reputation composition operator.
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